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ADDRESS: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INTERPRETATION: OUT OF "LOCK-STEP" AND
BEYOND "REACTIVE" DECISIONMAKING*
David M. Skover**
One of the central objectives of former President Reagan's Administration was "decentralization:" dismantling the federal regulatory agencies and entrusting the state governments with control
over economic and social relations. Yet, it must be remembered
that decentralization was not an idea invented by the Reagan Administration. At least since 1970, the United States Supreme
Court, led by Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, has done its
share to move American law out of federal courtrooms.
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court's trend of "judicial decentralization" was most apparent in its constitutional doctrines of jurisdiction and justiciability,1 which effectively closed the federal
courthouse doors to many individual rights plaintiffs. In the
Court's past two terms, however, "judicial decentralization" has
taken a different tack. In major substantive areas-civil rights and
affirmative action, privacy and abortion, criminal justice, constitutional taking and religious establishment-the Rehnquist Court
has engineered a conservative retrenchment in individual rights
* Copyright 1989, David M. Skover. This piece is the transcript of a speech delivered at
Constitutional Symposium '89, a dialogue focusing on the Montana Constitution at the
University of Montana, on November 18, 1989.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. A.B. 1974,
Princeton University; J.D. 1978, Yale Law School. Law clerk, Judge Jon 0. Newman, United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut and Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Co-author of forthcoming textbook, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: CASES & COMMENTARY.
1. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (art. III standing restrictions); City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (same); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (abstention if unique state constitutional provision); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (equitable restraint doctrine in
criminal context); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (equitable restraint doctrine in
civil enforcement setting); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (fourteenth amendment state action doctrine); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (habeas corpus review
restrictions).
The momentum for "judicial decentralization" via federal jurisdiction doctrines did not
abate in the 1980s. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (art. III standing restrictions); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (eleventh
amendment sovereign immunity); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (equitable
restraint doctrine applied to private civil proceedings); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (state action); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509 (1982) (total exhaustion rule for habeas corpus review); Teague v. Lane, U.S.
-,
109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (new constitutional rules in habeas petitions).
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doctrines.' The "gang of five" has closed the federal Constitution
to numerous individual rights claims. As Reagan judicial appointees account for more than half of all sitting federal district and
appellate court judges, and command a majority in all but four of
the twelve federal courts of appeals,3 there is every reason to believe that the conservative counterrevolution will continue and
intensify."
Without access to the federal courts and Constitution, rights
claimants increasingly have turned to the state judiciary for protection of fundamental liberties under state law. As a result, "judicial decentralization" has sparked the revitalization of state constitutional law as an independent source of authority for checking
state government abuses. The early period of the state constitutional renaissance (1970-1977) was largely confined to the Northwest and Northeast state high courts; moreover, independent reliance on state law was reserved typically for criminal justice cases
in which unique state constitutional guarantees were applicable or
definitive federal constitutional rulings were lacking. By the close
of 1989, however, state high courts will have invoked their own
constitutional law in some 600 cases in which the relief granted
would have been unavailable under the federal Constitution. More
than twenty different state high courts will have rested on their
own state constitutions to go beyond federal law minimums. And,
state law rulings will have touched a full spectrum of constitutional
concerns-including rights to abortion and abortion funding, privacy rights to die and to be free from compulsory drug testing,
equality of treatment cases involving school financing and gender
discrimination, freedom of expression on property accessed by the
public, gun control, zoning restrictions, caps on damages actions
2. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989)
(restrictions on § 1981 claims); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., U.S. -,
109 S. Ct.
706 (1989) (affirmative action); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., U.S. -,
109 S.
Ct. 3040 (1989) (abortion); Murray v. Giarratano, U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (right
of counsel for death row inmates); Arizona v. Youngblood, U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 333
(1988) (due process limits on rights to exculpatory evidence); United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987) (pretrial detention); Allegheny County v. A.C.L.U. Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (religious establishment); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (taking in inverse
condemnation).
3. Telephone interview with Sheila Joy, Staff Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General (Nov. 9, 1989). See Cunningham, Hanging Judges, NAT'L REV., May 27, 1988, at 40.
4. Ronald Reagan's enduring institutional legacy in the reshaping of the federal bench,
both in numbers and in judicial philosophy, is discussed at length in Collins & Skover, The
Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship,87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191-203 (1988) [hereinafter Liberal Legal Scholarship].
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and attorneys fees, and various forms of economic liberty.6 Justice

William Brennan has referred to the state constitutional law movement as "the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence today."' And, as evidenced by the more than
300 law review articles on state constitutional law topics published
between 1970 and 1986, the phenomenon has caught the attention
and imaginations of legal academics.7
Yet, vast territories of state constitutional law remain to be
explored-by state legislatures shaping economic and civil liberty
policies, by state courts deciding civil rights issues, by attorneys
litigating individual rights claims, and by interest groups and informed citizens lobbying for liberty protections. These players will
not fully appreciate their potential for state constitutional involvement, however, without a well-informed understanding of the various approaches available for the evolution of state constitutional
law. My comments today focus on the three most prevalent approaches for state constitutional law interpretation: "lock-step,"
"reactive," and "beyond the reactive." To a great degree, these
three approaches represent consecutive stages in a state high
court's liberation from the influence of federal constitutional doctrines established by the United States Supreme Court. As I examine the three approaches in turn, I will suggest how each minimizes or maximizes the capacity of state constitutional law to
provide independent, innovative, and intellectually powerful rights
guarantees. My views in this regard are still somewhat preliminary
and fluid. At the least, I would hope that these suggestions spark
further consideration and debate within and outside of the state
constitutional law community.
I. THE "LOCK-STEP" PHENOMENON

The first approach for state constitutional law interpretation
is the "lock-step." A state high court that adopts this approach will
look automatically to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court for the rules and standards to apply in the enforcement of a
5. Trends and figures are based on an update of the data in Collins & Galie, State
ConstitutionalLaw, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-9. These and other dimensions of the
renaissance of state constitutional law from 1970 to the present are discussed more fully in
Collins & Skover, supra note 4. Thoughtful analyses of state constitutional law develop-

ments in these substantive areas are provided in

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN-

MENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES AND OP-

PORTUNrrIES FOR STATE INITIATIVES (1989) (Report No. A-113) [hereinafter ACIR].
6. Brennan, Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law-Foreword,
13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988).
7. See supra note 5.
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state constitutional provision. Essentially, the doctrine and the
theory of state constitutional law will march along in step with federal constitutional developments.
The strong version of "lock-step" requires that a state rights
guarantee provide no more and no less protection than the corresponding federal constitutional liberty. For example, Article I, § 12
of the Florida Constitution commands that the individual right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures will "be construed in conformity with the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court."8
The weak version of "lock-step" does not dictate that the state
constitution incorporate jot-for-jot the United States Supreme
Court's federal law rulings. Rather, the state high court will rely on
a standard used for a federal constitutional claim to resolve a similar liberty issue under the state constitution. The Montana Supreme Court's 1986 decision in State v. Crain9 illustrates the weak
version of "lock-step." The court confirmed its dependence on the
lenient standard for probable cause to issue search warrants that
currently governs in the fourth amendment. 10 It explicitly refused
the open opportunity to impose a more stringent test for the sufficiency of evidence under the Montana search and seizure guarantee, an opportunity that had been taken by several states, including Alaska, 1 Connecticut,12 Massachusetts,' 3 New York, 4
Washington, 5 and, most recently in October of 1989, Tennessee."6
The "lock-step" approach comes with certain advantages. Because state constitutional interpretation is grounded entirely upon
federal law rulings, "lock-step" offers a "free rider" effect: state
judges and attorneys need not exert their own personal efforts or
expend institutional resources to create "ground up" theories of
state constitutional law provisions. Furthermore, "lock-step" may
serve a particular political or ideological perspective: if a state con8. FLA. CONST. amend. I, § 12 (1968, amended 1983). For an insightful critique of the
"lock-step" approach to state constitutional decisionmaking, in general, and for a narrowing
construction of the Florida "lock-step" amendment, in particular, see Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39
U. FLA. L. REv. 653 (1987).
9. 223 Mont. 167, 725 P.2d 209 (1986).
10. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
11. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985).
12. See State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985).
13. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
14. See People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
15. See State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
16. See State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989).
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stitution is not to fall out-of-step with federal rights protections, it
can never be used as a sword against the conservative attack on
the federal bill of rights.
Nevertheless, "lock-step" suffers from several serious and objectionable shortcomings. First, ambiguous federal law precedents
will introduce a large degree of indeterminacy and uncertainty into
state constitutional interpretation. Typically, state constitutional
decisionmaking involves individual rights issues that have not been
determined by the United States Supreme Court in similar factual
contexts or that have not been resolved in any authoritative fashion. In such cases, the "lock-step" approach leaves two options: either the state high court must hypothesize the rationales and results that the federal Supreme Court would likely have reached, or
the state high court must openly engage in independent state constitutional law analysis. The former option is "lock-step" in name
only, because the state high court invokes the authority of the federal Constitution to rationalize its own speculations on federal and
state constitutional law extensions. The latter option, of course,
highlights the deficiencies of the "lock-step" approach and essentially abandons it in the case at hand.
A second shortcoming of "lock-step" can be identified as "textual devaluation." By this, I mean that a "lock-step" approach is
likely to disregard significant differences in the texts of state and
federal constitutional liberty guarantees; if these textual differences might warrant a dissimilarity in treatment, "lock-step"
would devalue or depreciate the state constitutional text. For example, the first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." In contrast, the Washington Constitution's guarantee of free expression states: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right. ' 17 Quite obviously, the text of the Washington
free speech clause is not explicitly limited to violations by state
officials and reasonably could be enforced against private persons
who interfere unduly with another's expressive activities. In the
face of an earlier decision in which a plurality of the court read the
Washington guarantee more generously than the first amendment
on this basis exactly,1 8 the Washington high court recently depreci17. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
18. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d
108 (1981) (plurality opinion). An analysis of the Alderwood decision and of the irrelevancy
of the "state action" doctrine to state constitutional law generally is provided in Skover,
The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State
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ated the independent text of the Washington Constitution and
chose to remain in "lock-step" with "well understood and accepted
[federal] constitutional doctrine"'19 that "the Bill of Rights ...was

directed at 20rights against governmental authority, not other
individuals. ,

The "textual devaluation" problem of the "lock-step" approach might be overcome if a state high court borrowed federal
law standards only to enforce the clauses of the state constitution
that are textually identical or virtually identical to their federal
counterparts. This practice would culminate in a third shortcoming
of "lock-step," which Professor Ronald Collins has termed "the
problem of the divided Constitution."' 21 A state constitution will be

divided between the class of textually similar provisions tied to
federal constitutional interpretation and the class of textually dissimilar provisions open to independent interpretation by the state
high court. For example, in the Montana bill of rights, seventeen
provisions are without analogues in the federal Constitution, but at
least nine sections may be considered textually indistinguishable
from federal rights guarantees 22-including freedom of religion,2 3
self-incrimination, 4 search and seizure,2 due process of law,26 and
excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments, 7 among others.
The "lock-step" approach would treat these nine sections, at least,
as functionally meaningless for purposes of state constitutional interpretation. Why should the Montana Constitution, or any state
constitution, be a house divided? Why should certain individual
rights be liberated from any federal constitutional link and others
be held in bondage, given no independent state constitutional
value? It is hardly likely that state constitutional framers and ratifiers intended to deprive their state courts from breathing life
into a portion of their bill of rights, to consign that portion effectively to the United States Supreme Court for enforcement. It cannot be that textually similar guarantees are any less significant inAction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 240-50, 254-75 (1985) [hereinafter State Action].
19. Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d
413, 423, 780 P.2d 1282, 1287 (1989).
20. Id. at 423, 780 P.2d at 1287 n.21 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 771

(1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
21. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-TheMontana Disaster,63 TEx. L.
1095, 1117-23 (1985) [hereinafter Montana Disaster].
22. Id. at 1119-20.
23.

MONT. CONST. art. II,

§

REV.

5.

24. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25.
25. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
26. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17.
27. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/3
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dividual rights than textually dissimilar guarantees. More than the
mere fact of textual similarity or dissimilarity is required to justify
such a stark difference in treatment of classes of liberties in a unitary state bill of rights.
Three more shortcomings of the "lock-step" approach deserve
brief mention, because they may undermine the very federalist
structure that the U.S. Constitution is designed to preserve.
If interpretations of state constitutional law remain in "lockstep" with federal constitutional standards, a state high court automatically subjects its state law decisions to review and possible
reversal by the United States Supreme Court. Why? The resurgence of state constitutional law in the 1970s and 1980s to extend
protection to individual rights beyond federal constitutional minimums did not go unnoticed by the conservative wing of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts. In 1983, the Supreme Court modified its
jurisdictional doctrines to ensure that it might monitor the growing
trend of rights-expansion in the high state courts. In Michigan v.
Long,2 the Court established its presumptive power to review any
state high court decision granting greater protection to individual
rights than would be available under federal constitutional law.
Under the Michigan v. Long standards, the Supreme Court will
determine whether a state high court ruling truly rests on "independent and adequate" state law grounds. If the state high court
issues a "plain statement" of reliance on state constitutional law,
the decision is not likely to be reviewed; in the absence of a "plain
statement," if the state law decision appears to be grounded on
federal law principles, the Supreme Court may review it to determine whether federal law was wrongly interpreted and applied to
decide the case.2 1 "Lock-step," of course, denies state high court
judges the power to make independent judgments about the substantive guarantees of state constitutions. Essentially, "lock-step"
sacrifices state judicial immunity from perpetual supervision by
the federal judiciary.
Additionally, "lock-step" turns the entire state judiciary, when
it is interpreting the most fundamental law of the state, into a
"quasi-federal" court system. Because state constitutional deci28. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (revamping the adequate and independent state law grounds
doctrine).
29. Id. at 1041. The role that the U.S. Supreme Court's "independent and adequate
state law grounds" doctrine plays in the Court's current concerns for "Our Federalism" is
examined in Skover, "Powers of and Restraints on 'Our Federalism:' State Authority under
the Federal Constitution," in ACIR, supra note 5, at 22-23. See also Collins & Galie, Models
of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual
Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 339-48 (1986).
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sions are the equivalent of federal constitutional law interpretations under "lock-step," the state judges are acting, in effect, as
members of the inferior federal courts. Although a state high
court's adoption of the "lock-step" approach may not itself be inconsistent with principles of federalism, it is clearly a weak version
of federalism theory that would allocate the vertical division of
powers between the federal and state courts so as to discourage the
independent development of state constitutionalism.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court's rulings under the
federal Constitution may serve national objectives and values that
are inappropriate or irrelevant to state constitutional law decisionmaking. The Supreme Court's analysis may turn on the history
surrounding the adoption of the 1787 Constitution, the 1791 Bill of
Rights, the Civil War Amendments or others. Also, Supreme Court
decisions are likely to reflect national common consensus values; to
that degree, the level of individual rights protection under the federal Constitution will be geared to the ideology of the median of
the American people. Moreover, the Supreme Court may craft its
federal constitutional interpretations with an eye to the institutional limitations of the federal courts. To avoid the criticism that
an appointed, life-tenured, and electorally unaccountable branch
of the federal government is too actively involved in policy decisionmaking, the Court may defer to the authority of both Congress
and of the states to define the economic liberties and civil rights of
their citizens.8 0
State constitutional decisionmaking, however, should not be
tailored to account for these particular concerns. The legislative
history underpinning state rights' provisions is almost certain to
differ significantly from the historical purposes that characterized
the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights. Furthermore, although
protection of state liberties need only respond to the consensus
morality of the state's citizens, "lock-step" would tie state rights'
guarantees to the nation's median norms, possibly resulting in the
30. The Supreme Court's contemporary commerce clause, dormant commerce clause,
tenth amendment, economic substantive due process and equal protection, abstention, and
federal preemption doctrines reflect the degree to which these institutional concerns may
factor into the Court's enforcement of federal rights guarantees. See, e.g., Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (commerce clause and tenth amendment); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
("market participant" exception to dormant commerce clause analysis); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (due process and equal protection for socio-economic liberties); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention); Puerto
Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988) (state-protective presumption in the preemption doctrine). These doctrines are analyzed as instruments
of "Our Federalism" in ACIR, supra note 5, at 18-24.
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"underenforcement" ' 1 of the values expressed in the states' bills of
rights. Finally, the election of state judges and the more accessible
amendment process 2 under most state constitutions should provide political checks against excessive activism or usurpation of
legislative policymaking when a state court independently interprets its state's rights guarantees. 3
Considering the many shortcomings of the "lock-step" approach, the Montana Supreme Court's history with "lock-step"
should be of special interest to you. Although vacillating considerably over time in its interpretations of the Montana bill of rights, "
the Montana Supreme Court has chosen to remain all too frequently in "lock-step." To all appearances, the court's preference
for "lock-step" was most strongly declared in its 1983 decision in
State v. Jackson,3 5 when it determined that a criminal defendant's
refusal to take a breathalyzer test was "non-testimonial" evidence
that might be introduced at trial without violating the defendant's
state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. Former
Chief Justice Frank Haswell established that, because the language
of the state provision is virtually identical to that of the fifth
amendment protection in the United States Constitution, it "affords no basis for interpreting Montana's prohibition against selfincrimination more broadly than its federal counterpart." s6
31. I borrow this term from Professor Sager who insightfully articulated the concept of
"underenforced" constitutional values in the related context of federal constitutional guarantees. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1242-63 (1978).
32. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 (amendment processes by state
constitutional convention, legislative referendum, and initiative).
33. The divergence between the institutional limitations of the federal and state judiciaries in constitutional decisionmaking is discussed more fully in State Action, supra note
18, at 256-59.
34. See, e.g., State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 164, 566 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1977) (state
self-incrimination provision tied to federal fifth-amendment doctrine); Madison v. Yunker,
180 Mont. 54, 60, 589 P.2d 126, 129 (1978) (state constitutional provisions identical or virtually identical to federal counterparts are to be treated as "separate and enforceable constitutional rights"); State v. Jackson, 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983) (judicially proposed
"lock-step" approach); Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 215, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01 (1985) (textually identical state constitutional law provision may be "more demanding" than its federal
counterpart that protects "minimal" rights).
35. 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983). The most exhaustive account of the litigation
leading up to and including the Montana Supreme Court's 1983 decision in State v. Jackson, and a devastating critique of the "lock-step" approach adopted by the court in that
case, is provided in Montana Disaster,supra note 21.
36. Id. at 348, 672 P.2d at 260. In his concurring opinion, Justice Frank Morrison
argued for the strong version of "lock-step" in maintaining: "[Wihere language in the Montana State Constitution is identical [or nearly so] to language in the United States Constitution, we should feel bound by determinations made by the United States Supreme Court in
interpreting that language." Id. at 349, 672 P.2d at 260 (Morrison, J., concurring).
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Since State v. Jackson, Montana's high court has broken
"lock-step" occasionally, generally by conceding to the "divided
constitution" problem.17 For example, it has interpreted the Montana privacy provision to afford protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures beyond those that are available under the
United States Supreme Court's doctrines, 8 and it has found a fundamental right to "physical liberty" in the Montana equal protection clause sufficient to invalidate a law that subjected only one
class of juvenile delinquents to civil detention, a law which may
well have survived federal constitutional restraints.3 9 Interestingly,
one of the Montana Supreme Court's most recent applications of
the state constitution's right to counsel and self-incrimination provisions explicitly denounced the "lock-step" approach and held,
nevertheless, that breathalyzer tests may be admitted into evidence even though obtained without an attorney present, a result
which could have been reached by the "lock-step" approach of
40
State v. Jackson.

These decisions may be the overture to a judicial consciousness in Montana that eventually will retreat from "lock step."
Nothing could be more auspicious for the state constitutional law
movement. For, "lock-step" is particularly suspect in the context
of the Montana Constitution: ironically, the text of the Montana
bill of rights is unquestionably the most generous of any to be
found in the constitutions of the fifty American states.
Consider only a few of Montana's many expansive individual
rights provisions:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any
person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against
any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on ac37. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
38. See State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984) (despite virtually identical
state and federal search and seizure guarantees, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 applies to grant
more liberal protection than available under U.S. CONST. amend. IV). But see State v. Long,
216 Mont. 65, 700 P.2d 153 (1985) (because state privacy guarantee contemplates "state
action" only, landlord did not violate tenant's rights by entering apartment without authorization, and criminally probative evidence discovered by landlord need not be suppressed
under state constitutional exclusionary rule).
39. See In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 683 P.2d 931 (1984).
40. See State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986). What this case highlights is that a state high court's willingness to march out of "lock-step" does not inevitably
mean that a state constitutional provision will be independently interpreted so as to guarantee more protection to individual rights than its federal analogue would. Although "lockstep" ensures uniformity of federal and state constitutional standards and case results, a
court's retreat from "lock-step" does not necessarily ensure a difference in federal and state
standards or case results.
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count of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."
Every person shall be free to speak or publish whatever he [or
she] will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that
liberty.2'
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
43
compelling state interest.
The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include, but not
be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of
4
such persons .
The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental
entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or
property, except as may be specifically provided by law by a 2/3
vote of each house of the legislature."5
It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education
which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person
of the state. . . .The legislature shall provide a basic system of
free quality public elementary and secondary schools .... It shall
fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts
the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and second46
ary school system.
In the face of such a bill of rights, the Montana Supreme
Court's preference for "lock-step" might well be depicted in the
terms of Professor Ronald Collins as "the Montana Disaster.' 7 By
contrast, this state's judges and lawyers should contemplate "the
Montana Dream:" a bold and new experiment in state constitutional democracy. The potential for realizing the benefits of such
an experiment in state constitutionalism is greater in Montana
than in any other place in the country.

II.

OUT OF "LOCK-STEP"

AND INTO A REACTIVE POSTURE

Should the Montana Supreme Court abandon "lock-step" in a
clear and definitive manner, there will be a great temptation to fall
into a "reactive" posture. This is the second approach for state
constitutional law interpretation, characterizing the vast majority
41. MONT. CONST. art. II, §
42. MONT. CONST. art. II, §
43. MONT. CONST. art. II, §
44. MONT. CONST. art. II, §
45. MONT. CONST. art. II, §

4.
7.
10.

15.

18.
46. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1), (3). See infra text accompanying note 65.
47. See generally Montana Disaster, supra note 21.
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of state constitutional law cases to date. A state high court that
takes the "reactive" posture assumes that most state constitutional
provisions will remain in sync with federal law doctrines. In isolated cases, however, the state court will interpret state rights
guarantees to extend more protection than the federal minimums.
Typically, the "reactive" court treats the state bill of rights as a
depository for far-reaching, progressive and controversial federal
constitutional doctrines that have been discarded by the increasingly conservative federal judiciary.
Examples of "reactive" rulings are legion, but two should suffice to illustrate the posture. The New York 8 and Michigan 9 high
courts, among others, have relied on their state due process clauses
to strike municipal zoning ordinances restricting the occupancy of
single family housing to persons related by blood, even though
these ordinances would be valid under the federal Constitution.5
And, in contrast to the earlier example of "lock-step" in Washington's free speech doctrine,5 several states have found their constitutional rights of free expression and association to protect against
purely private interferences as well as government violations. Refusing to follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in
restricting first amendment rights on public access property, 2
these states have protected opportunities for effective political advocacy in private shopping centers, private auditoriums, and private university grounds.53
A state high court may prefer the "reactive" approach to state
constitutional interpretation for two reasons. First, the court may
consider the "reactive" posture to be a compromise position between systematic reliance on federal constitutional standards
48. See McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 551, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1244,
498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (1985).
49. See Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 265-69, 351 N.W.2d 831,
838-40 (1984).
50. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding local ordinance
that imposed limits on the numbers and types of blood-unrelated groups that could occupy
a single dwelling).
51. See supra note 19.
52. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (labor picketint, ji business in private shopping center cannot constitutionally be restricted); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (restricting the "state
action" analysis of Logan Valley Plaza and prohibiting the distribution of anti-war handbills in private shopping center) and Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling
Logan Valley Plaza).
53. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341,
347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979) (privately owned shopping center); Commonwealth v.
Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (Pa. 1981) (lecture hall at private college); State v. Schmid, 84
N.J. 535, 566-69, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (1980) (private university grounds).
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under "lock-step" and systematic development of independent
state constitutional doctrines. Fortuitously, this compromise is
cost-effective, convenient and extremely flexible: the state judiciary
may enjoy the "free ride" on federal court rulings until dissimilarities in federal and state constitutional texts, in legislative histories,
or in fundamental policy objectives argue for a more sweeping
scope for state liberty guarantees.
Second, and even more significantly, the "reactive" posture is
the byproduct of the exclusive focus on federal constitutional law
that has dominated the legal profession since the Warren Court
years. State judges and attorneys practicing before them had no
realistic incentive to resort to state constitutional law as long as
the United States Supreme Court championed liberal fundamental
rights causes. Despite the conservative counterrevolution in federal
liberties, however, well-ingrained habits die hard. The legal mindset .remains largely wedded to a federal law perspective, and recourse to state rights provisions is still the exception rather than
the rule."'
Understandable as these reasons for the "reactive" posture
may be, the phenomenon is regrettable. A sporadic and selective
appeal to the state bill of rights is vulnerable to criticisms that
state constitutional interpretation is result-oriented and unprincipled. Furthermore, if the "reactive" approach merely picks up discarded federal rights doctrines and enforces them through state
law guarantees, state constitutional claims and arguments will be
advanced within an analytic framework that was not designed particularly for the concerns and values of the state's citizens. 5 Currently, the trend of "judicial decentralization" fosters a "new federalism" in which state constitutional law may be revitalized.
III. "BEYOND THE REACTIVE"
Such a revitalization can only be realized fully if, in their approach to state constitutional interpretation, judges, lawyers and
scholars move "beyond the reactive." What does it mean for state
constitutionalism to move "beyond the reactive?" It means no less
than a systematic and exclusive reliance on state law. It means
that a state court need not take into account the individual rights
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, except to establish
that an interpretation of state law will not fall below minimum
federal protection. It means the creation of novel and innovative
54.
55.

See Liberal Legal Scholarship,supra note 4, at 195-98, 216-18.
See supra text accompanying notes at 30-31.
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state law theories of the freedoms of expression and religious exercise, of the principles of anti-discrimination and procedural fairness, of economic and privacy liberties.
Striking proposals are emerging in state constitutional decisionmaking that demonstrate that it is, indeed, possible to build
new theories of state individual rights "from the ground up." Consider only a few examples of the many exciting experiments in
state constitutionalism being conducted throughout the nation.
As early as 1977, the California Supreme Court recognized
that its state equal protection guarantees possess "an independent
vitality that, in a given case, may demand an analysis different
from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable." 56 Under these equality provisions, the court invalidated the California public school financing system for discriminating on the basis of a school district's property wealth. Rejecting
the United States Supreme Court's fourteenth amendment jurisprudence,5 7 the California court established an independent "fundamental" interest analysis that elevates liberties "which lie at the
core of our free and representative form of government. 5 8 The
high courts of five other states-Kansas, 9 New Jersey, ° West Virginia, 1 Wisconsin,"2 and Wyominga 3-have relied on the California
Supreme Court's reasoning to find "foundational" public school financing schemes " unconstitutional under their state equal protection provisions. Although invoking similar equality concerns, the
Montana Supreme Court recently held that the state's public
school funding plan violated the Montana Constitution's education
maintenance provision. 5 Rendering its decision on February 1,
56. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345,
366 (1976).
57. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (under federal
equal protection doctrine, wealth is not a suspect classifying trait and education is not a
"fundamental" interest explicitly or implicitly protected by the terms of the Constitution).
58. Serrano, 18 Cal. 3d at 767-68, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
59. See Knowles v. State Bd. of Educ., 219 Kan. 271, 547 P.2d 699 (1976).
60. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
61. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
62. See Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
63. See Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
64. A "foundational" public school financing plan guarantees each school district
within the state a basic level, or "foundation," of educational funding, regardless of disparities in district property tax bases. The state constitutional public school financing cases
have all challenged some form of "foundational" funding. For an excellent analysis of state
constitutional protections of rights to public education, see Katz, State ConstitutionalLaw
and State Educational Policy, in ACIR, supra note 5, at 109-17.
65. See Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 236 Mont. 60, 784 P.2d 412 (1989)
(modifying 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989)) (construing MONT. CONST. art. X, §§ 1(1),

(3)).
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1989, Montana is among the most recent to join six other states 6
in using express guarantees of public educational opportunities to
strike "foundational" financing systems.
In 1982, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that created and defined the crime of "coercion" on the basis that,
as written, the statute penalized communications that are protected by the Oregon free speech clause.6 7 In an impressive majority opinion by Justice Hans Linde, the court developed a coherent
and comprehensive theory of freedom of expression, forbidding
any prohibition on speech or writing on any subject whatsoever unless the prohibition falls within an historically established exception to the state guarantee.6 8 The court's theory led it, in 1987, to
extend free speech protections to obscene materials.6 9
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court's recent
Webster decision,7 0 which undercut the strength of federal abortion rights, the Florida Supreme Court declared invalid the state's
statutory requirement for parental consent before an unmarried
minor might obtain an abortion. In a bold and decisive opinion
issued on October 5, 1989, the court established a broad concept of
constitutional privacy under the Florida Constitution.7 1 Following
in Florida's footsteps only seven days later, the California Court of
Appeals for the First District preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of its state statute that prohibits therapeutic abortions for
unemancipated minors without parental consent.7 2 Construing California's express privacy clause to guarantee the same fundamental
rights of abortion to all women, whether adults or minors, the
court held that the state's interference with a minor's choice of
abortion would likely be invalid.
For a last and important example, in 1986, the Washington
Supreme Court announced its adoption of the philosophy of "state
66. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983) (ARK.
CONST. art. XIV, § 1); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (CONN. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1); Rose v. Council of Better Educ., No. 88-SC-804-TG, slip op. (Ky. Sup. Ct.
June 8, 1989) (Ky. CONST. § 183); Abbott v. Burke, 1990 N.J. Lexis 64 (decided June 5, 1990)
(construing N.J. CONST. art., VIII, § 4(1) ("thorough and efficient clause")); Edgewook Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1); Seattle
School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1,

2).
67. See State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
68. Id. at 407-13, 649 P.2d at 573-77.
69. See State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987).
70. See supra note 2.
71. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
72. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Camp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263
Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989).
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law first" 73 for constitutional litigation and decisionmaking.74 Ruling that the Washington search and seizure clause prevents the installation of a pen register on telephone connections without a warrant, the court articulated six criteria for Washington judges to use
in state constitutional analysis. At a minimum, Washington courts
are to examine: 1) the textual language of the state constitution; 2)
the differences in the texts -of parallel provisions of the state and
federal constitutions; 3) state constitutional and common law history; 4) preexisting state law; 5) structural differences between the
federal and state constitutions; and, 6) matters of particular state
interest or concern. 76 Although these factors are neither dispositive
nor exclusive, they provide a theoretical framework by which the
development of Washington constitutional law may progress. 7 Encompassed in all six criteria, perhaps, is a single preeminent criterion: the analytical soundness of any claim or argument based on
state law, quite apart from what the United States Supreme Court
may or may not have decided with respect to a similar claim or
argument under federal law.
As these examples suggest, the legal profession must pay a
price to move state constitutional law "beyond the reactive." Selfreliant state rights doctrines require the ingenious thought, stylistic craftsmanship and plain hard work of the entire state bench
and bar. These efforts cannot be limited, however, to the judge's
chamber or the attorney's office. Innovative state law theory will
depend upon substantial reform in law school curricula, as well.
Incredible as it may seem, constitutional law courses at most of the
nation's law schools focus entirely on the federal Constitution. Today's leading constitutional law textbooks totally ignore the burgeoning developments in state constitutional law and individual
rights. This federal law bias in our classrooms fosters a distorted
vision of American constitutionalism and reinforces counterproductive litigation habits. State judges are not apt to resolve
state constitutional claims in the future unless the coming generations of young lawyers raise them and present them effectively.
73. For thoughtful discussions of this philosophy, see generally Linde, E
Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165 (1984) [hereinafter
E Pluribus]; Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981).
74. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). See also State v.
Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988).
75. Gunwall, 110 Wash. 2d at 65-67, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
76. The Washington high court's six-point program for state constitutional analysis is
discussed more fully in Utter, Interpreting State Constitutions: An Independent Path, 15
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP.

23 (Summer 1989) (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

Relations).
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Yet, even now, America's law schools are not training their students to do so.
Certainly, the price cannot outweigh the substantial advantages of moving state law "beyond the reactive." First, state judges
no longer act as members of the federal judiciary when they construct state law theories of individual rights from the "ground up."
If their rationales are based squarely on state constitutional law,
typically immune from United
their decisions will be final and
77
review.
Court
States Supreme
Second, state judges will no longer look solely for textual dissimilarities to justify independent interpretation of state rights
guarantees. This ensures that a state constitution will be a unitary
their
document, not a "house divided" between provisions that owe
78
vitality to the federal Constitution and those that do not.
Third, as Oregon Supreme Court Justice Linde explained with
great insight,7 9 a judicial philosophy of "state law first" is fully
consistent with fourteenth amendment theory. For, if state constitutional law provides an adequate remedy for an individual rights
claim that itself will not violate the federal Constitution, and state
judges look first to the state law for relief in a constitutional challenge, there will be no cognizable federal constitutional action for
state deprivation of individual rights.
Fourth, and most significantly, by breaking out of "lock-step"
and moving "beyond the reactive," state judges breathe new life
into the federalist system on which this United States was
founded. Independent reliance on the state constitution vindicates
the traditional creed of Justice Louis Brandeis that, in a union of
separate and sovereign states, each state may act as a "laboratory
'80
of experimentation.
Ultimately, for Montana, moving "beyond the reactive" means
that its politicians, its jurists and its lawyers will live up to the
promises in the state declaration of rights that "[t]he people have
the exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign,
and independent state"8 and that "[a]ll persons are born free and
'82
have certain inalienable rights.

77. See supra text accompanying notes at 28-29.
78. See supra text accompanying notes at 21.
79. See E Pluribus,supra note 73, at 193-200.
80. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
81. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 2.
82. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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